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In the current framework of human rights, data privacy is 
finding its home as an independent human right, separate 
from its historical home under the umbrella of general privacy. 
However, there is no consistent system or standard for defining 
this right, and different regions require substantially different 
levels of protection. This inconsistency has allowed for 
corporations, by way of their executive officers, to avoid or 
completely ignore the requirements imposed by many 
countries. Moreover, the penalties in many regions are not 
severe enough to incentivize corporations to change their 
behavior. The lack of a truly global system and standard for 
enforcing this right, and the specific lack of pressure on the 
officers that direct corporate policy, has allowed data privacy 
violations to go severely under-checked. 
This Note seeks to provide a novel solution for tackling 
corporate holdup in complying with data privacy laws. This 
Note examines the historical roots of data privacy as a human 
right, discusses its similarity to resources that have been 
considered public utilities, and provides examples of instances 
where the right to data privacy has been ignored by corporate 
officers. By modifying the United Nations’ existing sanction 
procedure and jurisdiction, this Note proposes that the United 
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Nations would be able to target corporate officers individually 
for their roles in data privacy violations. By leveraging 
personal liability for noncompliance, the United Nations could 
generate a global sense of accountability to the modern, human 
right to privacy in one’s personal data. 
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“Privacy and security are the ultimate shared 
responsibility and everyone, including governments, 
companies, and citizens, [has] an important role to play.”1  
 
1 Charles Arthur, Google’s Jared Cohen Discusses the Digital Future – 
Live Q&A, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/tech 
nology/2013/apr/24/google-jared-cohen-digital-future [https://perma.cc 
/RSH3-MLY5] (quoting Jared Cohen of Google’s response to a question). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Managing data privacy has never been more important to 
corporate responsibilities than now. In the wake of data crises 
like the hack of more than 100 million Target shoppers’ credit 
card and contact information, the hack that exposed all three 
billion Yahoo users’ personal information, and the Equifax 
hack that revealed more than 147 million users’ personal 
information—including social security numbers—corporate 
officers have been forced to rethink their companies’ 
strategies for protecting user data.2 These breaches not only 
effect financial valuation during a sale or merger; they can 
also result in substantial lawsuit settlements and financial 
penalties.3 
Yet even in the face of these precedents, many giant data-
driven companies continue to fail at protecting users’ data.4 
Even as regulations and laws that cover data privacy more 
broadly than ever before are emerging globally with 
increasing frequency5—providing companies with improved 
guidance on how they should be managing user data—
commentators have suggested that some companies have 
circumvented these regulations or even blatantly violated 
them.6 This raises the questions of whether the existing 
 
2 See Taylor Armerding, The 18 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st 
Century, CSO (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/ 
data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2UQM-2VZ7]. 
3 See id. 
4 See, e.g., Russell Brandom, The Facebook Hack Could Be Europe’s 
First Big Online Privacy Battle, VERGE (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/1/17922946/facebook-breach-gdpr-
lawsuit-privacy-commissioner-europe [https://perma.cc/4VRT-RJ8B]; Jon 
Porter, Google Accused of GDPR Privacy Violations by Seven Countries, 
VERGE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/27/18114111 
/google-location-tracking-gdpr-challenge-european-deceptive [https://pe 
rma.cc/U5BV-9JKJ].  
5 See Ronan Shields, American Data Privacy Laws Are a Matter of How, 
Not If, ADWEEK (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/programmatic/ 
privacy-laws-are-a-matter-of-how-not-if/ [https://perma.cc/G9L9-U4W5/]. 
6 See Brandom, supra note 4; see also Matt Novak, Facebook and Google 
Accused of Violating GDPR on First Day of the New European Privacy Law, 
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penalties surrounding data privacy are severe enough and 
whether a substantive change in policy is warranted. While 
some of the more recent regulations like the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) in Europe protect member 
states’ citizens by imposing severe financial penalties on 
corporate rule violators,7 there is no global deterrent that 
incentivizes corporate officers to change their companies’ 
policies to better protect user data from misappropriation. 
Without such a global system, it is likely that corporate data 
privacy practices will not prioritize user information 
protection or prevent human rights violations. 
Part II of this Note addresses the current state of data 
privacy rights with a particular focus on the obligations 
imposed on companies in the European Union (“EU”), the 
United States, and the United Nations (“UN”). This Part also 
explains how data privacy came to be widely acknowledged as 
a human right. Part III addresses a variety of issues relating 
to the sanctioning of corporate officers, including the 
historical nature of sanctions and the role that data-driven 
companies have in the utility regulation scheme. Finally, Part 
IV of this Note proposes a novel solution for generating top-
down compliance with data privacy laws on a global level 
using the United Nations and sanctions regimes. 
II. BACKGROUND ON DATA PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Over the past forty years, data privacy has moved to the 
forefront of the international rights debate. Namely, two key 
questions have dominated the conversation: (1) what rights do 
people possess in regards to their own information, and (2) 
how far does the right to privacy extend?8 As technology and 
 
GIZMODO (May 25, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-and-google-accused-
of-violating-gdpr-on-first-1826321323 [https://perma.cc/Y5C8-JBSL]. 
7 See GDPR Overview, GDPREU.ORG, https://www.gdpreu.org 
[https://perma.cc/E3ZN-EG9H]; see also CONSUMERS INT’L, THE STATE OF 
DATA PROTECTION RULES AROUND THE WORLD: A BRIEFING FOR CONSUMER 
ORGANISATIONS 5 (2018), https://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1 
55133/gdpr-briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAA5-E62S]. 
8 See Eve Maler, Data Privacy Day: Assessing the State of the Privacy 
Nation in 2019, GDPR:REPORT (Jan. 29, 2019), https://gdpr.report/news/ 
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the nature of how personal data can be used have evolved in 
tandem, these rights have been called into question, causing 
many countries to prioritize their protection.9  
Especially noteworthy is the gradual transition of data 
privacy away from being considered a purely privacy-related 
right toward its inclusion under the broader human rights 
umbrella.10 The right to privacy has existed in international 
doctrine for decades, most notably appearing in Article 12 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).11 
However, in the past decade, the increase in data leaks and 
unauthorized disclosures of personal information has raised 
questions about data’s place in the privacy arena.12 Moreover, 
the lack of proactivity by corporations in preventing data 
privacy violations has raised grave concerns about private 
data management, which precipitated a dialogue around 





9 See generally Oliver Diggelmann & Maria Nicole Cleis, How the 
Right to Privacy Became a Human Right, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441 (2014); 
see also James Reynolds, What’s Data Protection Got to Do with Human 
Rights?, RIGHTSINFO (Aug. 17, 2017), https://rightsinfo.org/whats-data-
protection-got-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/MJF9-3FBJ]. 
10 See Nithin Coca, How the Push to Make Data Privacy a Human Right 
Will Impact Businesses, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.triplepundit.com/special/data-privacy-symantec-series-
2018/how-the-push-to-make-data-privacy-a-human-right-will-impact-
businesses/ [https://perma.cc/3D5N-C2VZ].  
11 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 
12 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”). 
12 See Valentina Maria Ariemme, Recent Developments in the 
Recognition of Digital Privacy as a Human Right, EUR. TAX STUD., no. 2, 
2014, at 78. 
13 Coca, supra note 10 (“Companies, particularly in the technology 
space, have been more reactive than proactive on data privacy. For 
consumer privacy to really come to the forefront, it is likely that government 
will also have to play a role—especially in instances where consumers don’t 
have a choice to switch to a privacy-protecting alternative.”). 
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An annual report from the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights linked these data 
privacy issues to human rights, stating that although data 
and the internet provide for an improvement of human rights, 
“[i]n the digital era, communications technologies also have 
enhanced the capacity of Governments, enterprises and 
individuals to conduct surveillance, interception and data 
collection.”14 At the crux of this statement is the idea that 
when dealing with data transfers and the internet in general, 
“the rights held by citizens offline must also be protected 
online.”15 Interestingly, chief executive officers (“CEOs”) of 
some of the companies facing the greatest risk of incurring 
penalties for data privacy violations are calling for data 
privacy rights to be recognized as human rights.16 This 
response is not altogether surprising, however, considering 
the breadth of the data these companies know they are 
collecting––anything from users’ musical preferences to their 
social media contacts may be stored on corporate servers.17 As 
 
14 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014). 
15 Ariemme, supra note 12, at 79. 
16 See Privacy Is “A Human Right”: Apple CEO Tim Cook, MSNBC 
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/watch/privacy-is-a-human-
right-apple-ceo-tim-cook-1197152323753?v=railb& [https://perma.cc/PR3V-
K777] (“[Data] privacy . . . is a human right, it’s a civil liberty . . . like 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.”); see also Rachel Lerman, Data 
Privacy Is a Human Right, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella Says, STUFF (May 
8, 2018) https://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/digital-living/103709739/data-
privacy-is-a-human-right-microsoft-ceo-satya-nadella-says [https://perma. 
cc/N3FM-78R2] (“[Microsoft’s CEO] praised the [GDPR], calling [data] 
privacy a human right.”). 
17 See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Firms Are Buying, Sharing Your Online Info. 
What Can You Do About It?, NPR (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/07/11/485571291/firm
s-are-buying-sharing-your-online-info-what-can-you-do-about-it 
[https://perma.cc/376P-JBNT]; Steve Poreca, How Big Data Shows Big 
Results with Spotify, NE. U. LEVEL (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nort 
heastern.edu/levelblog/2018/04/27/big-data-shows-big-results-spotify/ 
[https://perma.cc/TXD6-VT8N]; Mark van Rijmenam, What Data Do the 
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likely users of their own technology, it would be incredibly 
hard for these CEOs to deny the “human” element of the data 
they knowingly process and to deny the implications of not 
managing that information carefully. 
Companies that deal in data have had to react to this 
changing mindset—some responding more successfully than 
others. On the first effective day of the GDPR, both Facebook 
and Google were accused of violations, including requiring 
users to consent to targeted advertising to use the services as 
well as unnecessarily collecting data.18 Prior to these alleged 
violations, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg had stated that 
Facebook would be ready to comply by the time the GDPR took 
effect.19  
Some companies, however, have responded favorably to 
the changing law and policy in the data privacy arena. When 
the retail giant Target was hacked in 2013 and had millions 
of customers’ credit card information stolen, the company 
responded in the following months with a variety of data 
security measures, including practical support for affected 
customers (e.g. discounts, credit monitoring, etc.), an overhaul 
of its security systems, and additional employee training in 
how to protect customers’ sensitive information.20 In addition, 
Uber has taken a strong position on data privacy by 
terminating an in-house attorney and security officer who 
covered up evidence of a data breach and failed to comply with 
legal reporting obligations.21 
 
18 See Chris Foxx, Google and Facebook Accused of Breaking GDPR 
Laws, BBC (May 25, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
44252327 [https://perma.cc/YTX7-EPKL]; see also Novak, supra note 6. 
19 See Novak, supra note 6. 
20 Eric Dezenhall, A Look Back at the Target Breach, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-dezenhall/a-look-back-
at-the-target_b_7000816.html [https://perma.cc/GRP4-QCQJ] (last updated 
June 6, 2015).  
21 Lorelei Laird, Uber Ousts In-House Counsel Who Suppressed 
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CEOs, as the managers and strategic heads of these 
companies, wield incredible power and influence, 22 extending 
to the treatment of data privacy concerns and compliance with 
laws protecting data privacy rights. The need for sound 
corporate strategies to successfully adhere to the growing 
number of data privacy regulations should be paramount to 
the CEO of any data-managing company. CEOs are currently 
insulated from personal liability by most corporate law 
regimes. Although companies themselves may be liable for 
breaching data privacy laws, this Note will suggest that 
directors should be personally liable at the highest 
international levels for severe missteps in data privacy 
protection. After all, if data privacy is now considered a 
human right—as recognized by many corporate officers 
themselves—the world is substantially less likely to be 
forgiving.23 
A. The Current State of Corporate Data Privacy 
Obligations 
This Note considers how three different systems—the EU, 
the United States, and the UN—protect data privacy rights. 
All three systems tackle protection of data rights differently, 
and the penalties they assess range from small-scale 
injunctive measures to billions of dollars in fines.24 In all of 
 
22 See Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Governance and CEO Dominance, 50 
WASHBURN L.J. 611, 616 (2011). 
23 See Sarah St. Vincent, Data Privacy Is a Human Right. Europe Is 
Moving Toward Recognizing That., FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://fpif.org/data-privacy-is-a-human-right-europe-is-moving-toward-
recognizing-that/ [https://perma.cc/YPS9-ZQ5Z]; see also James Nickel, 
Human Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Feb. 7, 2003), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rights-human/ 
[https://perma.cc/E97P-UVKH] (last updated Nov. 8, 2014) (“Human rights 
declarations and treaties are intended to change existing norms, not just 
describe the existing moral consensus.”). 
24 See Fines and Penalties, GDPREU.ORG, https://www.gdpreu.org/ 
compliance/fines-and-penalties/ [https://perma.cc/UX9Q-APKG]; see also 
Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, THOMSON 
REUTERS PRAC. L., Oct. 1, 2018, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com 
/6-502-0467?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&first 
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these regimes, however, particular focus is placed on the 
obligations that companies have in maintaining users’ data 
privacy.25 Another commonality among the systems is that 
the strongest data privacy regulations exist only at the 
national or regional level.26 
A key enforcement issue for each set of policies is the lack 
of truly international oversight; this is especially true as the 
lines between government and the private sector blur due to 
government reliance on the private sector for data processing 
and collection.27 There is no strong international voice 
providing guidance on penalties for misappropriation of 
sensitive data, leaving open a gap that an international 
organization like the United Nations should fill. 
1. The European Union Approach 
In May 2018, the GDPR28 came into effect in the EU, 
replacing the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) of 1995, as 
 
Page=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1 (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). 
25 See Jolly, supra note 24. 
26 See generally GDPR Overview, supra note 7; see also Jolly, supra note 
24; Deborah Thoren-Peden & Catherine Meyer, USA: Data Protection 2018, 
INT’L COMP. L. GUIDES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-
protection-laws-and-regulations/usa#chaptercontent1 [https://perma.cc/2C 
E5-VBJ8]. For an example of a state statute, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
22575 (West 2019). 
27 PRIVACY INT’L, THE KEYS TO DATA PROTECTION 5 (2018), 
https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/Data%20P 
rotection%20COMPLETE.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQB4-CR86] (“There is 
often little or no public consultation, transparency of resource-allocation, 
and oversight or audits of how these systems are functioning. Additionally, 
governments are increasingly relying on industry to deploy systems and run 
software; equally, industry are becoming dependent on governments 
sanctioning access to data. In this way, the separation between government 
and industry will blur, and this will fuse their respective duties and 
obligations.”). 
28 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L119) 1. 
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a comprehensive attempt to protect EU citizens’ data rights. 
It carries heavy penalties for any data holder or processor who 
abuses citizens’ data.29 The GDPR factors in the seriousness 
of a company’s effort to comply with the requirements in 
determining the magnitude of the fine.30 Violations of its 
requirements can include a fine of up to €20 million 
(approximately $22.5 million as of this writing), or four 
percent of a company’s worldwide annual revenue of the prior 
financial year, whichever is higher.31 
When the European Commission announced its plan to 
overhaul the GDPR’s predecessor, it put particular emphasis 
on increasing the “responsibility and accountability” of 
companies engaged in data processing both in the EU and 
abroad.32 The personal data intended to be covered by the 
regulation was broad, including anything from a person’s 
name to their IP address to their comprehensive medical 
records.33 The GDPR, as passed, achieved this initial goal of 
the Commission by protecting expansive categories of 
 
29 See Ivan Klekovic, EU GDPR vs. European Data Protection Directive, 
EU GDPR ACAD.: EU GDPR BLOG (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://advisera.com/eugdpracademy/blog/2017/10/30/eu-gdpr-vs-european-
data-protection-directive/ [https://perma.cc/V24L-XV2Z] (discussing the 
main changes brought upon by the GDPR, including an expansion of what 
is considered personal information in the digital world, higher burdens on 
data processors, an expansion of extra-territorial obligations on EU based 
processors and controllers, and significantly higher fines for violations); see 
also GDPR Overview, supra note 7. 
30 See Danny Palmer, What Is GDPR? Everything You Need to Know 
About the New General Data Protection Regulations, ZDNET (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-an-executive-guide-to-what-you-need-
to-know/ [https://perma.cc/9A5A-VB34] (“[GDPR] [f]ines will depend on the 
severity of the breach and on whether the company is deemed to have taken 
compliance and regulations around security in a serious enough manner.”). 
31 Fines and Penalties, supra note 24. 
32 See European Commission Press Release IP/12/46, Commission 
Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to Increase 
Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm [https://perma.cc/46 
LE-Z6KG].  
33 See id. 
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personal data as outlined in Articles 4(1) and 9(1).34 This wide 
range of protected types of data, however, mainly places 
substantial pressure on companies to make sure that they are 
getting the “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous” 
consent of their users for the various types of data they may 
collect, store or process for them.35 
In addition to being inclusive in the types of data it 
protects, the GDPR is also equally inclusive in the parties that 
are subject to its regulations. The GDPR “not only applies to 
organisations located within the EU but also applies to 
organisations located outside of the EU if they offer goods or 
services to, or monitor the behaviour of, EU data subjects.”36 
Moreover, the GDPR is applicable to “all companies 
processing and holding the personal data of data subjects 
residing in the European Union, regardless of the company’s 
location.”37  
The GDPR requires companies to obtain user consent if 
they intend to use a person’s sensitive data.38 The conditions 
for consent “must be given in an intelligible and easily 
 
34 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
arts. 4, 9, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33–35, 38–39. Data can include a number of 
different identifiers, “such as a name, an identification number, location 
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that 
natural person.” Id. at art. 4(1). In addition, the GDPR states:  
Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade 
union membership, and the processing of genetic data, 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a 
natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a 
natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited.  
Id. at art. 9(1). 
35 Id. at art. 4(11).  
36 GDPR FAQs, EUGDPR.ORG, https://eugdpr.org/the-regulation/gdpr-
faqs/ [https://perma.cc/HCK5-937Z].  
37 Id. 
38 See id. 
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accessible form, with the purpose for data processing attached 
to that consent, meaning it must be unambiguous.”39 
Individuals must also be able to easily withdraw this 
consent.40 Overall, these provisions make for some of the 
strictest regulations on data privacy currently in existence. 
2. The United States Approach 
U.S. companies are also subject to a host of laws and 
regulations protecting data privacy.41 There are laws at both 
the federal and state levels, with the federal laws focusing 
primarily on industry sector regulation and the state laws 
focusing more on protecting individuals’ personal information 
from misappropriation.42 However, the varying levels of 
protection provided by different states can make it difficult for 
companies to know what levels of protection apply to them.43 
For example, a company that processes data in both the 
United States and the European Union would be subject to 
two differing levels of protection, as the GDPR is more 
comprehensive than similar regulations in the United 
States.44 And due to the breadth of the GDPR’s 
 
39 Id. 
40 See id. 
41 See Thoren-Peden & Meyer, supra note 26; see also Eric Vanderburg, 
Information Security Compliance: Which Regulations Relate to Me?, TCDI 
BLOG, https://www.tcdi.com/information-security-compliance-which-
regulations/ [https://perma.cc/4Q2G-P2XK]; Stuart Tarmy, Healthcare 
Companies Struggle to Comply with GDPR Data Privacy Regulations, 
DATAVERSITY (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.dataversity.net/healthcare-
companies-struggle-comply-gdpr-data-privacy-regulations/ [https://perma. 
cc/5R6Y-8FX8].  
42 See Thoren-Peden & Meyer, supra note 26. 
43 See generally Data Security Laws: Private Sector, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommu 
nications-and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/9MYU-RS2K]. 
44 See Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Why a Privacy Law Like 
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extraterritorial reach, that same company could be held liable 
for processing an EU user’s data in the United States if it does 
not comply with GDPR requirements.45 This problem, which 
can be confusing for companies and increase the likelihood of 
data privacy violations, highlights the need for a standard 
level of protection and a centralized authority to evaluate 
purported violations. 
Penalties for violations of U.S. data privacy laws can be 
civil and/or criminal, and involve remedies such as fines, 
injunctions, and varying criminal penalties.46 Examples of 
U.S. federal laws protecting data privacy include the Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act, the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act and the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act.47 Additionally, laws like Massachusetts’s 201 CMR 1700 
and the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 protect data 
on a state level.48 The fines for violations of these laws tend to 
be connected to the number of infractions and vary in the 
amount of financial penalties per violation.49 The FTC, one of 
the main enforcement agencies, draws its power from section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits 
 
e83/?utm_term=.148d6642a95e [https://perma.cc/4Z8P-QRFY]; see also 
Europe’s Tough New Data-Protection Law, ECONOMIST (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/04/05/europes-tough-new-data-
protection-law [https://perma.cc/9UTU-ANFG]. 
45 See Hawkins, supra note 44. 
46 See Thoren-Peden & Meyer, supra note 26. 
47 See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 
1338, 1343 (1999) (“[E]fficiently deliver information and services that are 
financial in nature through the use of technological means, including any 
application necessary to protect the security or efficacy of systems for the 
transmission of data or financial transactions[.]”); id. § 501 (“It is the policy 
of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and 
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect 
the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal 
information.”); see also Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 
(2012); Other Requirements Relating to Uses and Disclosures of Protected 
Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2019). 
48 See Thoren-Peden & Meyer, supra note 26; see also CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1798.100–.199 (West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 
17 (2009).  
49 See Thoren-Peden & Meyer, supra note 26. 
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“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”50 Both the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
and the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“DHHS”), another common enforcement agency, have 
assigned millions of dollars in penalties to companies 
violating federal data privacy laws.51 
The U.S. regime differs from the EU’s GDPR, which holds 
companies liable based on the severity of the infraction 
without assigning each individual infraction a monetary 
value.52 However, the key difference between the two regimes 
is that “the United States does not frame data privacy as a 
fundamental right.” and “[n]either the U.S. Constitution nor 
the Bill of Rights mentions ‘privacy.’ Nonetheless, an 
interpreted right to privacy has emerged in constitutional 
jurisprudence.”53 This divergence between the two 
jurisdictions on the fundamental nature of the right to privacy 
is likely related to the substantially smaller liability the 
 
50 Margaret Byrne Sedgewick, Transborder Data Privacy as Trade, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2017) (“Since 2002, the FTC has brought 
approximately 100 actions against companies to protect millions of 
consumers from deceptive and unfair data practices. Under the unfairness 
prong, the FTC pursues businesses for practices that ‘cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves’ and not ‘outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
to competition.’”) (citing Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) 
(2012)); see also Julie Brill, Former Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Global 
Regulation of Data Flows in a Post-Snowden World — Killingstad Global 
Insights Lecture at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College (Feb. 
18, 2015), (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2015/02/global-regulation-data-flows-post-snowden-world-
killingstad-global [https://perma.cc/KVK8-7ML5]). 
51 See Thoren-Peden & Meyer, supra note 26; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., Anthem Pays OCR $16 Million in Record HIPAA 




52 See Fines and Penalties, supra note 24. 
53 Sedgewick, supra note 50, at 1522. 
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United States imposes for data privacy violations as compared 
to the EU.54  
3. The United Nations Approach 
Finally, the U.N. recognizes data privacy rights, but it 
deals with state actors’ obligations and not private corporate 
obligations. In 1988, the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights issued CCPR General Comment No. 16, which 
indicates that member states have an obligation to protect 
every person from “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence as well as against 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation,” including 
personal data stored on computers or data banks.55 This 
Comment also recognized the shift from thinking of data 
privacy as a purely privacy-centered right to a specific type of 
human right.56  
In many ways, the U.N.’s approach to data privacy is 
stronger than that of countries like the United States because 
it explicitly ties data privacy rights to the general right to 
privacy.57 The U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution 
calling on member states to take actions to address violations 
of data privacy and to update their national legislation 
accordingly.58 Of particular interest is the U.N.’s request for 
member states to create national oversight bodies to monitor 
for data privacy violations.59 As discussed in Part III.B, the 
current regulatory regimes overseeing data privacy rights 
reinforce the notion that data is a modern utility and should 
be regulated accordingly. 
 
54 See David Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data 
Privacy?, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-
data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/HS24-HG5Q]. 
55 Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CCPR General 
Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of 
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and 
Reputation on its Thirty-Second Session ¶¶ 1, 10 (Apr. 8, 1994). 
56 See id.; see also Diggelmann & Cleis, supra note 9. 
57 See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013).  
58 Id. ¶ 4. 
59 Id. 
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The U.N. has not addressed private actors’ violations of 
individuals right to data privacy, primarily because the U.N. 
was not created with the intention of dealing with non-state 
actors.60 But this does not mean that it is impossible to create 
such a system. A framework already exists for imposing 
sanctions on state actors, including serious sanctions for gross 
human rights violations.61 In principle, this framework could 
be extended to cover the violation of data privacy rights by 
non-state actors.  
III. ISSUES IN APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS ON 
PRIVATE, CORPORATE OFFICERS 
The fines, both threatened and imposed, on companies by 
laws and regulations like the GDPR may not effectively alter 
corporate actions to the extent intended.62 While existing data 
privacy regimes attempt to deter data privacy violations, the 
main issue is that the mega, data-driven companies like 
Google and Facebook earn exceedingly high revenues that 
current fines, even at the higher end of the range, do not dent 
corporate coffers enough to create the deterrent effect for 
which they were designed.63 While it is true that “[i]n addition 
to civil and criminal sanctions, security breaches can have far 
reaching consequences for companies in terms of loss of 
 
60 See Noah Birkhäuser, Sanctions of the Security Council Against 
Individuals – Some Human Rights Problems (May 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://esil-sedi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Birkhauser.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3U7K-G4YN].  
61 See UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses 
Them, UN NEWS (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter UN Sanctions], 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/528382-un-sanctions-what-they-are-
how-they-work-and-who-uses-them [https://perma.cc/PA7Z-BDGF].  
62 See Matt Novak, Facebook Fined Just $645,000 in UK Over 
Cambridge Analytica Scandal, Money It Makes in Less Than 10 Minutes, 
GIZMODO (Oct. 25, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-fined-just-645-000-
in-uk-over-cambridge-analy-1829989116 [https://perma.cc/3U2T-XXU8]. 
63 See id. (“Facebook has been fined £500,000 ($645,000) by the 
United Kingdom . . . over the Cambridge Analytica scandal. The miniscule 
fine was the most allowed under the law, but Facebook can probably find 
that kind of money in its couch cushions. Based on last year’s revenue, 
Facebook makes $645,000 in less than 9 minutes of operation.”). 
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customer confidence and trust, customer churn, and loss of 
revenue, market share, brand and shareholder value,” the 
reliance many consumers have on data driven companies like 
Google and Facebook may dilute the response from corporate 
officers in dealing with data privacy violations.64 
A. Sanctions are Historically Targeted at Government 
Agents 
In general, sanctions—as outlined in Chapter VII of the 
U.N.’s Charter—are a tool used to enforce compliance with 
international laws and U.N. standards or to punish extreme 
actions.65 The U.N. Security Council hands down these 
sanctions, and they have taken a number of forms, including 
“comprehensive economic and trade sanctions” and “more 
targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and 
financial or commodity restrictions.”66  
There is no procedure for an individual to petition the U.N. 
Security Council if they are sanctioned. Currently, only states 
may appear before the U.N. Security Council to challenge the 
sanctions or attempt to show that they have resolved the 
issues that led to the sanction.67 This could raise serious 
issues in the data privacy space if a CEO or other corporate 
officer was targeted by an international sanction, as he or she 
might not be able to show on an individual basis that the 
company had become compliant with U.N. standards in order 
to get the sanction lifted. Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of 
Procedure of the U.N. Security Council provides that the U.N. 
Security Council can only allow member states to appear 
before the Council and, although the states may invite others 
to supply additional information, there is no provision that 
would allow an individual to appear to discuss an issue that 
 
64 See Jolly, supra note 24. 
65 See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41. 
66 Sanctions, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/ 
securitycouncil/sanctions/information [https://perma.cc/5SX2-ND4F]. 
67 See Birkhäuser, supra note 60, at 2 n.7. 
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addresses only themselves.68 This means a corporate officer 
would not only have to appear before the Council as the guest 
of a member state, but he or she may still be unable to address 
the Council if the issue raised concerns only a personal, not 
national, problem.69 
As individuals are not permitted to go before the Security 
Council in matters concerning themselves, U.N. member 
states alone must uphold sanctions against them.70 This can 
be problematic if a state chooses to ignore the mandate of the 
Security Council. Even if a private sanction existed under 
U.N. regulations, corporations that have the bulk of their 
assets in a certain country may be able to avoid the full force 
of a sanction if that country refuses to enforce the sanction.71 
In other words, sanctions cannot be weaponized or used as a 
deterrent unless they are enforced by the member state.72 
Although the U.N. retains the ability to garner agreements 
from member states to enforce Security Council sanctions and 
may call upon member states to honor those agreements, 
 
68 Id. at 2 n.7. See generally United Nations Security Council 
Provisional Rules of Procedure 37, 39, https://www.un.org/security 
council/content/rop/chapter-6 [https://perma.cc/DV28-URHC]. 
69 See Birkhäuser, supra note 60, at 2–3. 
70 See id. at 2. 
71 See generally Benjamin Alter, Sanctions Are Congress’s Path Back 
to Foreign Policy Relevance, LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.lawfare 
blog.com/sanctions-are-congresss-path-back-foreign-policy-relevance 
[https://perma.cc/J3R3-MW86]; see also Robbie Gramer & Dan de Luce, 
State Department Scraps Sanctions Office, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/26/state-department-scraps-sanctions-
office/ [https://perma.cc/5AQQ-D4W9]; James A. Paul & Senwan Akhtar, 




72 See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. (Jan. 22, 1996), https://www.asil.org/insights 
/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law [https://perma.cc/SZ4V-
JVQ2]; see also Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Full Support of 
Member States Key to Effective Sanctions Regimes, Assistant Secretary-
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sanction enforcement has historically fallen to the discretion 
of the individual state.73 Because these sanctions have 
historically targeted member states and government actors,74 
it may be useful to frame data and tech CEOs as agents of 
companies that serve a purpose similar to that of a public 
utility when generating future compliance guidelines. 
Sanctioning of private individuals for human rights 
violations has received some traction in recent years, notably 
with the passage of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Accountability Act in the United States.75 Under this Act, the 
President of the United States has the power to sanction 
individuals, including private actors, for human rights 
abuses.76 These sanctions can include a host of tactics such as 
visa blockages, asset freezes, and prohibitions on transacting 
with U.S. businesses and banks.77 
B. The Role of Data-Driven Companies as Utilities 
Today, communication primarily occurs through data, 
supplanting utilities like telephone services in importance.78 
Because of this, what constitutes a utility under a traditional 
framework should be reexamined. Companies like Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon not only highlight the extent to which 
data-driven companies have become ingrained in society, but 
they also provide insight into the new ways in which global 
 
73 See Kirgis, supra note 72. 
74 See generally Birkhäuser, supra note 60. 
75 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Pub L. No. 114-
328, 130 Stat. 2533 (2016). 
76 Id. § 1263(a)(1). 
77 Id. at § 1263(b). See generally The US Global Magnitsky Act: 
Questions and Answers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/13/us-global-magnitsky-act 
[https://perma.cc/X5WC-PPDT].  
78 See generally Larry Alton, Phone Calls, Texts or Email? Here’s How 
Millennials Prefer to Communicate, FORBES (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larryalton/2017/05/11/how-do-millennials-
prefer-to-communicate/#6a83fc596d6f [https://perma.cc/RQG9-SY7K]; see 
also Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans, 
GALLUP (Nov. 10, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/179288/new-era-
communication-americans.aspx [https://perma.cc/UF4V-63Y2].  
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communication primarily occurs.79 Historically, 
communication was only possible through postal mail or via 
telephones and telegraphs, but with the advent of satellites 
and advancements in computing and data processing, global 
communication can occur virtually instantaneously with 
applications like Apple’s FaceTime, Skype, Google Talk, or 
any number of other applications that share data between 
users.80 Just as traditional forms of communication were 
regulated as utilities, the next generation of regulations may 
similarly target the realm of data-driven communication as a 
modern utility. 
However, defining these services as utilities is difficult, 
because the term “utility” itself is ambiguous. When 
attempting to define a utility, “[m]ost descriptions of the 
concept are circular: a utility is a company, such as a 
telephone network, water, or electricity provider, which has 
special obligations because it functions as a public utility.”81 
Social media and data-driven companies have so far appeared 
to defy this definition for a multitude of reasons, including 
their constant displacement of one another, their lack of 
connection with other utilities’ essentiality of “survival, 
economic success, or online life,” and the fact that people could 
go their entire lives without ever using their services.82 
 
79 See generally Vineet Kaul, The Changing World of Media & 
Communication, 2 J. MASS COMM. & JOURNALISM 116 (2012). 
80 See Vineet Kaul, The Digital Communications Revolution, 2 ONLINE 
J. COMM. & MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES, July 2012, at 113, 114–15, 
http://www.ojcmt.net/download/the-digital-communications-revolution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9GEN-9BR2]; see also Social Networking Provides 
Instantaneous Communication Worldwide, BBG COMM. (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bbgcommunicationscorp.com/social-network-innovations/arti 
cle/10.php [https://perma.cc/G368-W584]. 
81 Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1788 n.126 
(2011) (“A public utility is a business that furnishes an everyday necessity 
to the public at large. Public utilities provide water, electricity, natural gas, 
telephone service, and other essentials.”) (citing WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN LAW 173 (2d ed. 1998)). 
82 Adam Thierer, The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as 
Public Utilities, 21 J. COMM. L. & TECH. POL’Y 249, 277 (2013). 
  
No. 2:763] RAISING THE STAKES 783 
As a result, while telephones and postal mail are regulated 
as utilities in many parts of the world,83 the same cannot be 
said of more modern forms of communication. In the United 
States, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
regulates wireless communication, but not to the same degree 
as wired communication or other more tangible utilities like 
water or electricity.84 Regulating utilities generally deals with 
the managing of natural monopolies to ensure adequate and 
safe distribution.85 With most communication happening 
through wireless mediums now, it makes sense to begin 
regulating this form of communication more heavily to protect 
users’ interests.  
There is concern that regulation of the internet and 
wireless communication on a level similar to water and 
electricity could stifle competition and innovation in these 
spaces.86 However, if the regulations were targeted at 
protecting the key, narrow interest of data privacy, it may be 
possible to minimize any disruption to competition or 
innovation.87 By focusing less on prices or the availability of 
the “utility” and instead on protective measures aimed at 
preventing data misappropriation, it may be possible to 
regulate utilities in a way that is as modern as the utility 
 
83 See What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/U68D-GLVG]; 
About the Postal Regulatory Commission, POSTAL REG. COMMISSION, 
https://www.prc.gov/about [https://perma.cc/82V7-MDHR]. 
84 See Joe Harpaz, The Internet: Commodity or Utility?, FORBES (Jan. 
27, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2015/01/27/the-internet-
commodity-or-utility/#694af84f6eff [https://perma.cc/UUN6-964V].  
85 See Sean Ross, How Strongly Does Government Regulation Impact 




86 See id. 
87 See generally Thierer, supra note 82, at 251; see also Mark Newton 
Lowry & Lawrence Kaufman, Performance-Based Regulation of Utilities, 23 
ENERGY L.J. 399, 426 (2002). 
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itself.88 An additional concern is that regulation can often 
open an industry to political influence, as regulations are 
handled by agencies with heads appointed by the governing 
political party.89 As a result, the regulation of an industry as 
a public utility often transforms the industry into one that is 
controlled by interested parties.90 In the case of data-driven 
companies and social media agents, classifying them as 
utilities and allowing interest groups to take control and 
entrench themselves as regulators may do more harm than 
good, as their interests may not align with the need for 
increased data privacy and regulation. 
In addition, a key question here is who should do the 
regulating? As addressed in Part IV, the regulators will need 
international reach, because data can be spread across the 
globe faster than the blink of an eye. Regulating data in one 
country would not be enough to rein in data-driven companies 
who operate globally—at least not in a way that would 
pressure their executives to take truly substantive measures 
to change their data-protection policies. 
Whether these data companies are actually considered 
utilities under traditional standards remains unclear.91 
However, the need to implement stronger regulations that 
prevent data breaches or data misappropriation by companies 
maintaining user data is clear.92 Without a stronger 
protection regime with heavier penalties, it is unlikely that 
these critical data resources will receive the protection they 
 
88 See Thierer, supra note 82, at 288–89; see also Newton & Kaufman, 
note 87, at 426. 
89 See Thierer, supra note 82, at 272–73. 
90 See id. at 271–72 (discussing “capture theory” in utility regulation 
and its detrimental effects on consumers and the industry as a whole). 
91 See Catherine Andrews, Data-As-a-Utility: A New Era for the Public 
Sector, GOVLOOP (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.govloop.com/resources/data-
as-a-utility-a-new-era-for-the-public-sector/ [https://perma.cc/623B-7PDQ]; 
see also Mark A. Jamison, Should Google Be Regulated as a Public Utility?, 
9 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 223, 231–34 (2013). 
92 See Adam Schwartz, You Should Have the Right to Sue Companies 
That Violate Your Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/you-should-have-right-sue-
companies-violate-your-privacy [https://perma.cc/3U8V-NRKL].  
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require.93 While classifying data companies as social utilities 
may not be the best course of action, regulating these 
companies to a higher degree certainly is. Just as the heads of 
historically regulated utilities and the companies that 
functioned within them were held responsible for critical 
failures, the new generation of leaders within the data realm 
should likewise face accountability when they fail.94 Because 
the nature of these failures is often global in scope, the 
regulation and accountability regime for addressing 
shortcomings should be proportionate. 
IV. CREATING A SANCTION ESTABLISHING 
PERSONAL LIABILITY AND APPLYING IT 
Creating a sanction that allows the U.N. Security Council 
to target corporate officers—primarily CEOs—for data 
privacy violations and enforce such a sanction is necessary to 
more effectively deter future data privacy violations on an 
international scale. Businesses that deal heavily with 
personal data and are knowing violators of international data 
privacy laws need a deterrent that moves beyond corporate 
fines and instead focuses on corporate officers as individuals. 
Companies like Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft all have 
prominent leaders with unparalleled influence over their 
companies’ compliance with data privacy laws.95 These 
leaders recognize the need for strong data privacy laws, and 
many recognize data privacy as a human right, however there 
is evidence that violations may still occur even in the face of 
 
93 See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: 
Punishment, Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 133, 145 (2004); see also Keith Johnson, What Is Consumer 




94 See O’Hear, supra note 93, at 141–46.  
95 Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on Its 
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financial penalties.96 By utilizing the world’s most 
internationally recognized legal body, the UN, it may be 
possible to hold corporate officers accountable for data privacy 
violations via the human rights framework.  
A. Wading into the Private Sector 
Many countries favor the U.N. playing an enlarged role in 
promoting human rights internationally.97 As discussed in 
Part II, data privacy is often now viewed more as a human 
right than a basic privacy right. With that particular 
distinction comes a heightened international scrutiny due to 
the sensitive nature of issues that often arise involving human 
rights. With a well-established framework for sanctioning 
state actors for violations of human rights, the extension of 
sanctions to private actors for severe data privacy violations 
that rise to the level of a human rights violations is not 
implausible. This is especially true when one considers that 
the companies these private actors lead could eventually be 
regarded as publicly regulated utilities.98 
1. Current U.N. Security Council Sanctions 
Framework 
As previously discussed, the U.N. Security Council has the 
power to issue sanctions in response to human rights 
violations. The U.N. Security Council, comprised of 
representatives from fifteen countries, may issue sanctions 
against states or state actors, subject to the veto power of the 
 
96 See James Sanders & Dan Patterson, Facebook Data Privacy 
Scandal: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/facebook-data-privacy-scandal-a-
cheat-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/9RCD-4JG3] (detailing the history of 
Facebook’s data privacy violations). 
97 In an international poll of select U.N. member states, an average of 
seventy percent of respondents per state favored the U.N. promoting human 
rights in member states, and majorities in most polled countries also 
favored the U.N. doing more than it currently is to achieve human rights 
objectives. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PUBLIC OPINION ON GLOBAL 87–
88 ISSUES (2009). 
98 See infra Section III.B. 
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Council’s five permanent members.99 The United States, 
Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom all hold veto 
powers over sanctions,100 and it is possible that they would 
prohibit sanctions targeting their own citizens for data 
privacy violations, a problem that is addressed in Section 
IV.A.3. 
Sanctions, supposedly a “last resort,” are so powerful on 
the international stage that the mere hint of them can induce 
the targeted party to begin to act.101 If the threat of sanctions 
does not work, the Council typically passes a resolution 
indicating who will be sanctioned and what those sanctions 
will entail.102 It can also set up a sanctions committee “to 
implement, monitor and provide recommendations to the 
Council on particular sanctions regimes,” pursuant to its 
Article 29 powers.103 Expert panels may also be implemented 
to assist the sanction committee in monitoring compliance and 
provide feedback to either the sanctions committee or the 
Council directly.104 These expert panels may be the best way 
 
99 See Functions and Powers, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers 
[https://perma.cc/6ZU9-L3XK]; see also Voting System, UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-
system [https://perma.cc/XN5H-FMB2]. There are fifteen total members on 
the Security Council, with five seats permanently filled by China, France, 
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the 
other ten seats are comprised of members elected for two-year terms by the 
general assembly. Current Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members 
[https://perma.cc/WMF8-LBSY]. Non-members can contribute to Security 
Council discussions, but they do not have a vote. Id. 
100 See Press Release, General Assembly, Member States Call for 
Removing Veto Power, Expanding Security Council to Include New 
Permanent Seats, as General Assembly Debates Reform Plans for 15-
Member Organ, U.N. Press Release GA/12091 (Nov. 20, 2018) [hereinafter 
Call for Removing Veto Power], https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ 
ga12091.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/NG3A-5QBU]. 
101 See UN Sanctions, supra note 61.  
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. (“An expert panel monitors the implementation of the sanctions 
measures and reports its findings to the committee, or in some cases directly 
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to address sanctions for data privacy violations against 
corporate officers, not only because the field of data processing 
is complex, but also because individuals lack standing to 
appear before the U.N. Security Council. These expert 
committees could meet with sanctioned corporate officers to 
monitor their compliance and recommend the Council lift the 
sanctions once compliance is confirmed.  
However, even after a sanction is issued, the Security 
Council relies on the members of the United Nations for the 
implementation and execution of its sanctions.105 This is often 
difficult due to the limited resources and limited political 
incentive that many nations have.106 However, in the case of 
asset freezes or travel bans—which would be most applicable 
to corporate executives—the cost of enforcement would likely 
be low. Moreover, because most people who access 
technological services are exposed to data privacy issues, and 
almost every country has citizens who access this technology, 
there is an inherent political incentive to prevent the 
exploitation of a country’s own citizens.107  
2. The Process for Establishing Authority 
Knowing that the framework for holding individuals 
accountable via U.N. sanctions exists, the next step is 
amending the U.N. Charter to allow the Security Council to 
target private individuals. This process is incredibly 
 
to the Council. Expert panels are usually comprised of between five to eight 
technical experts, all of whom are appointed by the Secretary-General. 
Expertise in these panels depends on the sanctions imposed, but may 
include . . . human rights/humanitarian experts.”); see also U.N. Charter 
art. 29 (“The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”). 
105 Jonathan Masters, What Are Economic Sanctions?, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-
economic-sanctions [https://perma.cc/U8MB-SCKF].  
106 Id. 
107 Hannah Ritchie, How Many Internet Users Does Each Country 
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challenging, 108 but if the initial alteration is limited enough 
in scope, it is possible that countries would agree to ratify the 
change. 
Chapter XVIII of the U.N. Charter allows for amendments 
to the Charter when two-thirds of the members present at a 
General Conference, including all five permanent members of 
the Security Council, agree to the change and ratify that 
change via their respective constitutional processes.109 While 
definitely challenging to achieve, the Charter has been 
amended multiple times throughout its history.110 In order to 
create a private sanction for corporate officers, an amendment 
is needed that would expand the authority of Chapter VI, 
Article 34 to allow for the investigation of private, non-state 
actors.111 The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security 
Council do not provide a mechanism for private parties to 
appear before the Council in regards to issues that only effect 
themselves.112 Adding language that notes that the Security 
 
108 See W. Michael Reisman, Amending the UN Charter: The Art of the 
Feasible, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 108, 108 (1994).  
109 U.N. Charter art. 108. 
110 See Can the UN Charter Be Amended, and How Many Times Has 
This Occurred? UNITED NATIONS DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY (Apr. 27, 
2018), http://ask.un.org/faq/140440 [https://perma.cc/Y6B2-2LS6]. The 
Charter has been amended five times, primarily to enlarge different 
councils. Id. 
111 U.N. Charter art. 34 (“The Security Council may investigate any 
dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give 
rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the 
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security.”). 
112 The only existing means for a private party to appear before the 
Security Council is when the private individual is providing information 
regarding a matter related to a member state. See United Nations Security 
Council Provisional Rule of Procedure 37, https://www.un.org/security 
council/content/rop/chapter-6 [https://perma.cc/DV28-URHC] (“Any 
Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security 
Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, 
to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before 
the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests 
of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to 
the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the 
Charter.”); id. at Rule 39 (“The Security Council may invite members of the 
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Council’s investigatory powers extend not only to state actors 
but also to private actors engaged in a global enterprise would 
be a means of increasing the Security Council’s jurisdiction. 
To narrow the scope of such amendment, language clarifying 
that these private actors are only subject to sanctions for 
human rights abuses may make the change more palatable to 
member states. If data privacy violations are to be the test 
case for expanding sanctionable parties, then limiting 
language will still be necessary. As proposed, general 
language extending authority to private actors still leaves 
room for many human rights violations that go beyond data 
privacy violations. To remedy this, additional language in the 
statue or a clarifying comment by the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights’ office should be added to clarify that this 
provision should only be invoked for data privacy violations. 
3. Avoiding a Veto 
The last obstacle to overcome in creating a private sanction 
is the potential of a veto from one of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. Many of the major data-
driven corporations are housed in two of the permanent 
Security Council members’ home countries—China and the 
United States113—and member states would likely resist 
sanctioning their domestic corporate officers. This veto 
potential is problematic because, even if these countries were 
to simply refuse enforcing the sanction in their own country, 
the veto prevents the sanction from coming into effect 
meaning that other U.N. member states would have no 
 
Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, 
to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining 
matters within its competence.”). 
113 See Sally French, China Has 9 of the World’s 20 Biggest Tech 
Companies, MARKETWATCH (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-has-9-of-the-worlds-20-biggest-
tech-companies-2018-05-31 [https://perma.cc/C5QE-VK74]. China and the 
U.S. dominate the tech market, splitting all top twenty slots between 
themselves. Id. 
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sanction to enforce at all.114 A veto would force member states 
to rely on their own domestic systems to create sanctions, 
which may be less likely to have the desired effect of a global, 
uniform sanction regime. Additionally, the five permanent 
members negotiated their veto power as a condition of their 
joining the UN,115 and eliminating it may trigger some of the 
most important superpowers to withdraw their membership, 
which would imperil the viability of the U.N. 
In order to make sure that a sanction is possible without 
being subjected to a potentially biased veto, it may be 
necessary to amend the U.N. Charter to eliminate the veto 
power of the permanent Security Council members. Article 
27(3) of the U.N. Charter requires the “concurring votes of the 
permanent members,”116 which means that if any permanent 
member votes against a resolution, it fails. Using the 
amendment procedures discussed above in relation to 
expanding authority of the council to target private 
individuals, the General Assembly could meet and vote to 
eliminate the language requiring permanent members’ 
concurrence. However, the likelihood of a measure 
eliminating the veto power passing is incredibly low with the 
dual requirements of a two-thirds vote by member states and 
affirmative votes from all five of the permanent Security 
Council members.117 
Making changes to the Security Council’s veto power has 
been a recurring suggestion for years.118 One of the most 
 
114 See The Veto, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-
methods/the-veto.php [https://perma.cc/8SV4-YYPJ].  
115 Gareth Evans, Should the UN Security Council Veto Be Limited?, 
WORLD ECON. F. (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/02/ 
should-the-un-security-council-veto-be-limited/ [https://perma.cc/GA3P-
RV4W] (“The right to veto was the price demanded by China, France, Great 
Britain, Russia, and the US for joining the UN. No one believes that a formal 
Charter amendment to abolish or limit this right is remotely likely.”). 
116 U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3. 
117 See Evans, supra note 115. 
118 See N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION, PATHWAYS TO SECURITY 
COUNCIL REFORM 4 (2014), https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/pathwa 
ys_sc_reform_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MQX-Q5RR].  
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recent proposals for change requested that permanent 
members refrain from using their veto powers according to the 
“responsibility to protect” (“R2P”) principle in cases of mass-
atrocities.119 Reframing of the R2P principle—which does not 
eliminate the veto power completely—could allow an 
expansion of the veto refrain to include cases of widespread 
data privacy violations. While not remotely close to genocide 
or mass killings, data privacy violations, as discussed above, 
do constitute human rights violations and often occur on a 
large scale that can affect billions of people globally.120 In such 
limited cases, which would ideally be the target of corporate 
officer sanctions, it would be reasonable to ask the permanent 
members of the Security Council to refrain from using their 
vetoes.  
Another possible mechanism for overcoming the veto 
would be to alter the U.N. Charter and allow the U.N. General 
Assembly to override a Security Council veto. The problem of 
getting consensus from all five permanent Security Council 
members still remains a problem, however.  
Yet, there may be a method for overcoming vetoes that 
already exists in the U.N. framework. Overriding vetoes is not 
without precedent; Resolution 377A—“Uniting for Peace”—
was passed by the U.N. in 1950 to allow assistance to South 
Korea after Russia attempted to veto an intervention.121 
Resolution 377 allows for U.N. action, without Security 
Council consensus, when international peace and security are 
 
119 Id. at 10. Additionally, permanent members have obligations 
under the U.N. Charter, as well as international humanitarian and 
human rights law, not to undermine the effectiveness of the U.N. or that 
body of law. See CITIZENS FOR GLOB. SOLS., THE RESPONSIBILITY NOT TO 
VETO: A WAY FORWARD 6 (2010), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
Responsibility_not_to_Veto_White_Paper_Final_7_14__2_.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CA59-TMMG]. 
120 See Amerding, supra note 2. 
121 Peter Tatchell, There Is a Way to Override Russia’s UN Veto – and 
Save Aleppo Before It’s Too Late, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/27/there-is-a-way-to-override-
russias-un-veto--and-save-aleppo-befo/ [https://perma.cc/ZY82-7T2T].  
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endangered.122 This is the most promising mechanism for 
avoiding a veto in cases when corporate officers perpetuate 
data privacy violations, because such violations would have 
global impact or severe enough effects to raise international 
alarm. Thus, these events would likely carry enough salience 
to garner enough votes to overcome a veto at either level. 
Other common proposed tactics for changing the power of 
the Security Council would involve expanding the Council to 
include other new permanent members or expanding seats on 
the Security Council generally.123 However, increasing 
permanent membership would only exacerbate the problem of 
state protectionism, and increasing general membership 
would not diminish the possibility of a veto. Thus, these 
tactics would be of little use to this Note’s proposed strategy 
for targeting corporate officers and avoiding a veto by a 
member state. The ultimate goal of creating a sanction that 
can reach corporate officers directly for their roles in data 
privacy violations, suppression of evidence of 
misappropriation, and other data misappropriations will 
likely require a total reworking of the U.N. sanctioning 
regime. While the prospect of amending the U.N.’s 
functionality in this way is admittedly lofty, member states 
would ultimately benefit from the protection that this system 
would afford. Data protection and accountability are critical 
to the protection of private interests, governmental affairs, 
and the economies of all member states. Given the U.N.’s 
ability to reach into and affect almost every country, it would 
be logical for the international entity to establish oversight 
over private individuals in the data privacy space. 
 
122 G.A. Res. 377 (V) A, Uniting for Peace (Nov. 3, 1950) (“Upon the 
invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the 
Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee 
when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the 
Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter 
with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission 
shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present 
and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in 
accordance with its authority under the Charter[.]”).  
123 See Call for Removing Veto Power, supra note 100. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The expanding nature of data processing and where that 
data is processed has opened users up to a whole range of 
possible privacy exposure points.124 The globalization of data-
driven companies means that users’ personal information can 
be acquired, stored, or transferred through any number of 
countries and exposed to the risk of misappropriation.125 The 
lack of clarity in user agreements, or in some cases, the lack 
of any agreement at all, means that users do not necessarily 
know how or by whom their data is being used.126 Corporate 
officers have an obligation, as the heads of their respective 
companies, to treat what is often individuals’ most sensitive 
information with heightened care. Unfortunately, officers 
have not taken that care consistently, and a number of 
companies have exposed their users to the highest levels of 
both cyber and physical harm.127 The repeated hacking of data 
centers and the sharing of data with untrustworthy sources 
has left users frantic because these companies often offer 
services that feel compulsory to use, and because it is almost 
impossible to separate oneself from them without suffering 
some kind of adverse blowback. 
While the possibility of allowing the U.N. to sanction 
corporate agents for their allowance or perpetuation of gross 
data privacy violations is ambitious, it certainly is not 
unreasonable. This Note proposes that creating the pathway 
to sanction these private actors with asset freezes, travel 
restrictions, and bans on their technology being used across 
 
124 See Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-
breaches [https://perma.cc/T36R-QSKV].  
125 See Nigel Cory, Cross-Border Data Flows: Where Are the Barriers, 
and What Do They Cost?, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (May 1, 2017), 
https://itif.org/publications/2017/05/01/cross-border-data-flows-where-are-
barriers-and-what-do-they-cost [https://perma.cc/AQ64-P63R].  
126 See Alex Hern, Privacy Policies of Tech Giants ‘Still Not GDPR-
Compliant’, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/jul/05/privacy-policies-facebook-amazon-google-not-
gdpr-compliant [https://perma.cc/7T2A-4N6F].  
127 See Amerding, supra note 2. 
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borders would create an effective deterrent that would 
hopefully propel more corporate agents to uphold 
international standards of data privacy and to protect those 
whose data they use for the benefit of their companies. Such 
an aggressive approach would hopefully allow for more global 
accountability and force companies to respect data privacy in 
all countries, not just those that strongly regulate data 
privacy.  
 
